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 We conduct laboratory experiments that explore how gender stereotypes shape beliefs about 
ability of oneself and others in different categories of knowledge.  The data reveal two 
patterns.  First, men’s and women’s beliefs about both oneself and others exceed observed 
ability on average, particularly in difficult tasks. Second, overestimation of ability by both 
men and women varies across categories. To understand these patterns, we develop a model 
that separates gender stereotypes from mis-estimation of ability related to the difficulty of the 
task. We find that stereotypes contribute to gender gaps in self-confidence, assessments of 
others, and behavior in a cooperative game.  
 
  
																																																								
1  Saïd School of Business, pedro.bordalo@sbs.ox.ac.uk. Harvard Business School, kcoffman@hbs.edu. 
Universita Bocconi, nicola.gennaioli@unibocconi.it. Harvard University, shleifer@fas.harvard.edu. We are 
grateful to James Pappas, Annie Kayser, Paulo Costa, and Marema Gaye for excellent research assistance, to 
Emanuel Vespa and Ryan Oprea for their incredible assistance with the Santa Barbara experiments, to Benjamin 
Enke, Josh Schwartzstein, and Neil Thakral for comments and to the Pershing Square Venture Fund for 
Research on the Foundations of Human Behavior and for financial support of this research.  Coffman thanks 
Harvard Business School for their financial support. Gennaioli thanks the European Research Council for 
financial support. 
	 2	
1.  Introduction 
Beliefs about ourselves and others are at the heart of many economic and social 
decisions, with large consequences for welfare.   One critical area where such beliefs are 
often found to be biased is abilities of men and women. Holding performance constant, 
women have been found to be less confident about their own ability in math and science then 
men, contributing to economically consequential differences in financial decision-making, 
academic performance, and career choices (Barber and Odean 2001, Buser, Niederle, and 
Oosterbeek 2014).  Biased beliefs about others also shape discrimination against both women 
and minorities (Bohren, Imas, and Rosenberg 2017, Grover, Pallais, and Pariente 2017).  
Such biases are inconsistent with the standard model of statistical discrimination (Arrow 
1973, Phelps 1972), in which equilibrium beliefs are accurate.  Identifying the sources of bias 
in beliefs about oneself and others is a significant yet insufficiently understood problem.   
One hypothesis is that beliefs respond to social stereotypes.  For example, women may 
be under-confident in math and science, and observers may be biased in judging women, 
because these fields are stereotypically male (Kiefer and Sekaquaptewa 2007, Nosek et al 
2009, Eccles, Jacobs, and Harold 1990, Guiso, Monte, Sapienza and Zingales 2008, Carrell, 
Page and West 2010, Reuben, Sapienza and Zingales 2014, Bohren, Imas, and Rosenberg 
2017). However, because beliefs are influenced by other factors, such as overconfidence, 
mis-estimation of probabilities, and self-image concerns, it may be difficult to identify 
stereotypes. An empirical strategy must separate alternative belief mechanisms.      
To address this challenge, we combine theory and experimental data in an analysis of 
beliefs about the ability of oneself and others. Following and extending the experimental 
setting of Coffman (2014), participants answer multiple-choice trivia questions in several 
categories, including the Kardashians, Disney movies, cooking, art and literature, emotion 
recognition, verbal skills, business, mathematics, cars, rock and roll, videogames, and sports 
and games. Participants then estimate both their total number of correct answers for each 
category, and the probability of answering each particular question correctly. They also 
provide beliefs about the performance of a randomly-selected partner.  For some participants, 
the gender of their partner is revealed, although we take some pains not to focus attention on 
gender.  In this way, for every participant, we have direct measures of their own performance 
in multiple domains, but also their estimates of both their own performance and that of their 
partner.  
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A comparison of different categories of knowledge enables us to assess stereotypes, 
which are by definition category-specific. A preliminary look at the data reveals that women, 
in fact, tend to overestimate their own performance in categories that are judged to be female-
typed. Likewise, when evaluating others, participants tend to overestimate the performance of 
women in categories that are judged to be female-typed. The reverse is true for men. 
These facts, while suggestive, do not allow us to identify the role of stereotypes. The 
problem is the presence of confounding belief distortions. Most notably, the data show that 
participants tend to overestimate performance for hard questions, where the share of correct 
answers is low. This is the case when assessing both self and others, as previously 
documented by Moore and Healy (2008). We call this phenomenon difficulty-induced mis-
estimation, or DIM. DIM can obscure the role of stereotypes, because different domains of 
knowledge exhibit different levels of difficulty for the two genders. To assess the role of 
stereotypes, we must separate them from DIM in the data. 
To disentangle these two forces shaping beliefs, we start with a model. We incorporate 
gender stereotypes by following the formalization of Bordalo et al. (2016), which builds on 
the “kernel of truth” property: beliefs exaggerate the ability of women in categories in which 
women are on average more competent than men, while underestimating it in categories 
where women are on average less competent than men. In a nutshell, the kernel of truth 
predicts that stereotypes exaggerate true gender performance gaps in different categories. We 
model DIM as an affine and increasing function relating question difficulty to beliefs. This 
formalization captures in reduced form several mechanisms that may give rise to DIM, 
ranging from imperfect knowledge of ability (Moore and Healy 2008), random errors or 
bounded estimates, over-precision, or overestimation of low probabilities (Kahneman and 
Tversky 1979).  
For empirical identification, the model assumes that the effects of DIM on beliefs about 
performance are orthogonal to the effects of stereotypes. DIM depends on task difficulty, 
whereas stereotypes depend only on the gender gap at the category level. Comparing easy 
and difficult questions in math should reveal the role of DIM. Comparing difficult questions 
in math to difficult questions in verbal should reveal the role of stereotypes. While an 
approximation, the orthogonality assumption takes an important methodological step toward 
isolating stereotypes from other first-order factors shaping beliefs. 
 We show that – after controlling for DIM – gender stereotypes are an important source 
of belief distortions.  Stereotypes are especially important for women, and for domains in 
which the gender gap in performance is larger.  We estimate that a 5 percentage point male 
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advantage in a domain (roughly the size of the male advantage in math in our sample) 
reduces a woman’s believed probability of answering a question correctly by between 2.2 – 
2.5 percentage points, holding her own true ability fixed. Similarly, when we analyze beliefs 
about others, a 5 percentage point male advantage in a domain reduces a participant’s belief 
of a woman’s ability by between 0.7 – 2.4 percentage points, holding fixed average female 
ability. Effects for men are more mixed. We estimate that a 5 percentage point male 
advantage increases men’s beliefs of own ability by between -0.2 – 1.1 percentage points, and 
other’s beliefs of men’s ability by 0.1 – 2.3 percentage points. We find support for the kernel 
of truth prediction in explaining beliefs about both own ability and that of others. Consistent 
with past work, we also find a substantial role for DIM in shaping beliefs. Participants on 
average overestimate the ability of themselves and others, particularly in more difficult 
questions and domains.  
We estimate that, conditional on item difficulty, the effects of DIM are similar for men 
and women. However, because in the data average item difficulty varies by domain and 
gender, DIM influences the gender gap in self-confidence. Our estimates actually show that 
DIM is an important countervailing force to stereotypes: it causes individuals to be more 
overconfident in categories where own gender performance is weaker, which by the kernel of 
truth are precisely the categories where stereotypes lower confidence. Stereotypes and DIM 
are thus two important but distinct forces shaping beliefs. 
 We next consider how beliefs about self and others influence decision making, measured 
here as a participant’s willingness to contribute ideas, as in Coffman (2014). Participants face 
a series of questions in each category and must decide how willing they are to answer the 
question for the group. Our experiment goes beyond Coffman (2014) by revealing gender of 
partner for some groups. We find two results. First, beliefs about self tend to become more 
stereotyped when the partner is known to be of a different gender. Second, stereotypes hurt 
the performance of groups in which gender is known. Under rational expectations, revealing 
the partner’s gender should be beneficial, for it provides information about relative 
competence, fostering better decisions. The data however shows that this is not the case: if 
anything, knowledge of the partner’s gender reduces performance, consistent with a negative 
impact of more stereotyped beliefs about self and partner. 
Our paper follows a large literature on beliefs about gender. Coffman (2014) shows that 
decisions about willingness to contribute ideas to a group are predicted by gender stereotypes 
in the form of subjective beliefs about a category’s gender-type. While closely following her 
paradigm, we make several new contributions. First, we offer a psychologically founded 
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theory of stereotypes based on observable gender gaps in performance and distinguish it from 
the confounding effect of DIM. Second, we identify a role for stereotypes by exogenously 
varying whether partner’s gender is revealed.  In our data, both stereotypes and DIM shape 
beliefs, with substantial predictive power for incentivized beliefs and decisions. 
 Other past work points to a role for both stereotypes and DIM in shaping beliefs about 
both one’s own and others’ ability. Many studies find that gender stereotypes in math and 
science influence academic performance (see Kiefer and Sekaquaptewa 2007 and Nosek et al 
2009 on implicit bias and test performance and Spencer, Steele and Quinn 1999 on stereotype 
threat). Both experimental and field evidence document a widespread belief that women have 
lower ability than men in math (Eccles, Jacobs, and Harold 1990, Guiso, Monte, Sapienza 
and Zingales 2008, Carrell, Page and West 2010, Reuben, Sapienza and Zingales 2014), even 
though the differences have been shrinking and now only exist at the upper tail (Goldin, Katz 
and Kuziemko 2006).  Guiso et al. (2008) find that actual male advantage in math disappears 
in cultures where gender stereotypes are weaker.  
Many researchers have studied gender differences in overconfidence. While it is difficult 
to draw definitive conclusions from this vast literature, a prevalent though far from universal 
finding is that men are more overconfident than women, but only, or primarily, in male-typed 
domains.2 This finding has been found in research that, like ours, asks participants to estimate 
their performance on a task (e.g., estimate your score on a test). Here some studies find no 
gender differences (Acker and Duck 2008), while others find men overestimating more than 
women when the domain is male-typed (Lundeberg, Fox, and Punćcohaŕ 1994, Deaux and 
Farris 1977, Pulford and Colman 1997, Beyer 1990, Beyer and Bowden 1997, Beyer 1998). 
By separating different beliefs distortions empirically, our analysis suggests that these prior 
results may be due to the category-specific impact of gender stereotypes.  
 
 
2. Experimental Design  
 We report three laboratory experiments, one at Ohio State University, one at Harvard 
Business School (but with most subjects being Harvard College undergraduates), and one at 																																																								
2 Some of these studies focus on qualitative questions. Campbell and Hackett (1986) ask students to assess their 
confidence in their performance and find that men provide higher ratings, but only for a number-adding task and not 
an anagram task. Fennema and Sherman (1978) ask students about their confidence in their ability to learn 
mathematics, with men on average indicating greater confidence than women. Other studies ask participants to rank 
themselves relative to others. Here, results are mixed, ranging from no gender differences to more male 
overplacement in male-typed domains (Niederle and Vesterlund 2007, Grosse and Reiner 2010, Dreber, Essen, and 
Ranehill 2011, Shurchkov 2012, Acker and Duck 2008). 
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the University of California Santa Barbara.3 Our goal is to collect detailed data on beliefs 
about both own and others’ ability in different domains and to link these beliefs to strategic 
decisions.  
Overview of Design 
All three experiments follow a three-part structure as in Coffman (2014).  In Part 1, each 
participant answers questions and assesses own performance in each category. We then 
randomly assign participants into groups of two. In Part 2, we use the procedure developed 
by Coffman (2014) to measure willingness to contribute answers to their group. In Part 3, we 
collect incentivized data on beliefs about own and partner’s ability in each category.  
The key departure from Coffman’s (2014) experiment is that when participants are 
assigned to groups, we randomly vary whether the gender of one’s partner is revealed. This 
allows us to: i) collect direct measures of beliefs about male and female performance, and ii) 
assess how team performance is influenced by knowing the gender of one’s partner. In 
revealing the gender of one’s partner we seek to avoid experimenter demand effects. To this 
end, we try to reveal gender in a subtle way. At Ohio State, we use photos of the partner, 
which convey gender but may also introduce confounds.  For instance, photos may reduce 
social distance between partners (Bohnet and Frey 1999) or render race or attractiveness top 
of mind.   For that reason, in the Harvard and UCSB experiments, we use a subtler method.  
At the moment of assignment to groups, the experimenter announces each pairing by calling 
out the two participant numbers. In the treatment where gender is not revealed, the 
experimenter simply announces the pairings. In the treatment where gender is revealed, 
participants are asked to call out, “Here”, when their participant number is announced. 
Because of the station partitions in the laboratory, it is highly likely that in this treatment a 
participant can hear the voice of his or her assigned partner, but not see them.   By restricting 
to the word, “Here”, we hope to limit the amount of conveyed information (through tone of 
voice, friendliness, etc.).  We thus suppose that only gender is likely to be revealed.4  In 																																																								
3 The first draft of this paper included only Experiments 1 and 2 (Ohio State and Harvard). We ran Experiment 3 
(UCSB) in response to feedback from an editor and referees, encouraging us to explore more strongly female-typed 
categories. In what follows, we analyze all data together. Analysis done separately for each experiment is presented 
in Appendix D.  
4 We validate this approach by asking a subset of participants at the conclusion of the experiment to guess the 
gender and ethnicity of their partner. Participants are significantly more likely to identify the gender of their partner 
in treatments where the voice is heard (correctly identified in 92% of cases where voice is revealed at Harvard and 
95% of cases where voice is revealed at UCSB compared to 67% of cases where voice is not revealed at Harvard, 
pairwise p-values of p<0.0001 and p<0.0001, respectively); they are not significantly more likely to identify 
ethnicity (correctly identified in 45% of cases where voice is revealed at Harvard and 41% of cases where voice is 
revealed at UCSB compared to 38% of cases where voice is not revealed at Harvard, pairwise p-values of p=0.28 
and p=0.59, respectively). 
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analyzing the data, we group all participants who received a photo or heard a voice as our 
“knew gender” treatment, performing an intent-to-treat analysis. 
 We designed the experiment to minimize the extent to which participants are focused on 
gender. Participants see no questions that refer to gender until the final demographic 
questions at the end of the experiment. Our findings may underestimate the importance of 
stereotypes, but we can be more confident that the effects we observe are not due to 
experimenter demand. 
Participants complete the experiment using a laboratory computer at an individual station 
and can work at their own pace.  In each part, they can earn points. At the end of the 
experiment, one part is randomly chosen for payment; participants receive a fixed show-up 
fee and additional pay for every point earned in the selected part.5 
We describe the experimental design in detail below. The full instructions and materials 
for each experiment are provided in Appendix A. 
 
Category Selection 
 In each experiment, participants answer questions in either four (OSU and Harvard) or 
six (UCSB) categories. At Ohio State, the categories are Arts and Literature (Art), Verbal 
Skills (Verbal), Mathematics (Math), and Sports and Games (Sports); at Harvard, we use Art, 
Emotion Recognition (Emotion), Business (Business), and Sports; at UCSB, we use 
Kardashians (Kard), Disney Movies (Disney), Cooking (Cooking), Cars (Cars), Rock and 
Roll (Rock), and Videogames (Videogames). All questions for each category can be found in 
Appendix A. 
We sought to select categories featuring substantial variation in gender gaps in 
performance. At OSU and Harvard, our prior was that Art, Emotion, and Verbal would be 
categories with female advantages, while Business, Math, and Sports would be categories 
with male advantages. For Art and Sports, this prior was informed by the study of Coffman 
(2014), which found observed performance differences and consistent perception gaps in her 
sample. Our priors for Verbal and Math are guided by observed gender differences on large-
scale standardized tests such as the SAT (see 																																																								
5 At Ohio State, participants earned a $5 show-up fee plus an additional dollar for every point earned in the selected 
part. At Harvard, they earned a $10 show-up fee, $15 for completing the experiment, and an additional $0.25 for 
every point earned in the selected part. At UCSB, participants earned a $10 show-up fee, $5 for completing the 
experiment, and $0.50 for every point earned in the chosen part. At UCSB, one participant per session was 
randomly-selected to receive $50 per point earned on one randomly-selected Part 3 question. These differences 
reflect requirements on the minimum and average payments across the labs (the $50 bonus at UCSB was geared 
toward increasing attention in later parts of a longer experiment).	
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http://media.collegeboard.com/digitalServices/pdf/research/2013/TotalGroup-2013.pdf for 
data). Neuroscientists and psychologists have identified a female advantage in the ability to 
recognize emotion (Hall and Matsumoto 2004).6  
While the ordering of gender gaps in performance across categories corresponds closely 
to our priors in the first two experiments, none of the categories produced significant female 
performance advantages. Because performance gaps are key to estimating our stereotypes 
model, we ran a new experiment targeting categories for which the observed gender gap 
would be large enough to offer a reliable test of the model, particularly categories displaying 
a female advantage. This experiment, conducted at UCSB, included categories that were pre-
tested as displaying larger, consistent gender gaps in performance, both in favor of women 
(Kardashians, Disney, Cooking) and in favor of men (Cars, Rock, Videogames).  
We also collect a direct measure of the perceived gender-type of the category. Following 
Coffman (2014), we ask participants to use a slider scale to indicate which gender, on 
average, knows more about each category in general. 7  This measure offers a direct 
measurement of stereotypes that can be compared to the kernel of truth hypothesis.  
 
Part 1: Measure of Individual Ability 
Participants answer a bank of 10 multiple-choice questions in each category, for a total 
of 40 at OSU and Harvard and 60 at UCSB. Each question has five possible answers. 
Participants earn 1 point for a correct answer and lose 1/4 point for an incorrect answer; they 
must provide an answer to each question. All questions from a category appear on the same 
page, in random order. Here we just collect a measure of individual ability in each category. 
 
Treatment Intervention 
Following completion of Part 1, participants are told that they have been randomly 
assigned to groups of two. In the control condition, no further information about partners is 
given. Treated participants at Ohio State are given a photo of the partner, and at Harvard and 
UCSB they hear the partner answer a roll call with the single word “here”. 																																																								
6 The Emotion Recognition questions are adapted from a quiz created by The Greater Good Science Center at UC 
Berkeley (https://greatergood.berkeley.edu/quizzes/take_quiz/ei_quiz), where a model displays an emotion and the 
respondent is asked to identify it. We follow this quiz and code one answer as being objectively “correct”, though 
we note that this may be seen as a more subjective category than the others.  
7 They use a sliding scale ranging from -1 to 1, where -1 means “women know more” and 1 means “men know 
more”. Participants report Kardashians, Disney, Art, Cooking, Emotion, and Verbal, as areas of female advantage 
(means of  -0.66, -0.42, -0.30, -0.30, -0.28, and -0.18, , respectively) and Business, Math, Rock, Sports, 
Videogames, and Cars as areas of male advantage (means of 0.15, 0.18, 0.27, 0.50, 0.56, and 0.60, respectively).  
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Bank-Level Belief Elicitation 
 Following the intervention, participants estimate their own and their partner's total score 
in each category in Part 1. For each category, they are asked to guess the total number of 
correct Part 1 answers they had, and that their randomly-assigned partner had. That is, they 
estimate their own Part 1 score out of 10 (and their partner’s Part 1 score out of 10) in Art, 
and then in Verbal Skills, etc. Participants receive an additional point for every correct guess, 
incentivizing them to give the guess they think is most likely to be correct. We refer to these 
guesses as bank-level beliefs, as they are elicited at the level of the 10-question bank for each 
category.  
 
Part 2: Place in Line Game 
Participants make decisions about their willingness to contribute answers to new 
questions in each category to their group. They are given 10 new questions in each category, 
for a total of 40 at OSU and Harvard and 60 at UCSB. As in Part 1, all questions appear on 
the same page, in a randomized order, labeled with their category. For each question, 
participants must indicate their answer to the question and how willing they are to have it 
count as the group answer.  
We determine group answers as in Coffman (2014).  For each question, participants are 
asked to choose a “place in line” between 1 and 4. The participant who submits the lower 
place in line for that question has her answer submitted as the group answer. To break ties, 
the computer flips a coin.  Both partners earn 1 point if the group answer is correct and lose 
1/4 point if the group answer is incorrect. Choosing a lower place in line weakly increases the 
probability that one’s answer is submitted for the group. Thus, we interpret place in line as 
“willingness to contribute”. 
To maximize bank-level belief data collected per participant, our experiment at UCSB 
then elicits another set of bank-level beliefs for each participant following Part 2. For each 
category, participants are again asked to estimate their own and their partner’s individual Part 
2 score out of 10 on each of the 10-question banks in Part 2.8,9  																																																								
8 For participants who were not treated prior to Part 2 (i.e., did not hear their partner’s voice), we take this 
opportunity to treat them following Part 2 and before the elicitation of Part 2 bank-specific beliefs. This gives us a 
set of bank-specific beliefs of a known gender partner for every participant in the USCB experiment, while still 
allowing for some groups to not know each other’s gender during the place in line game. We exploit this variation 
in Section 6. 
9 At OSU and Harvard, we used a fixed 40-question block of questions for Part 1 and a fixed 40-question block of 
questions for Part 2. That is, all participants saw the same block of questions in Part 1 and then they all saw the 
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Part 3: Question-Level Belief Elicitation 
 We collect data on question-level beliefs from participants. Participants revisit questions 
seen in earlier parts of the experiment. For each question, they estimate (a) the probability of 
their own answer being correct and/or (b) the probability of their partner's answer being 
correct. Participants are not reminded of their previous answers, and are never aware of what 
answers their partner has chosen. Depending on the treatment, some participants know their 
partner’s gender at this stage and others do not.10 
 Following the completion of Part 3, participants answer demographic questions about 
themselves and the slider scale questions.  Participants receive no feedback throughout the 
course of the experiment. Participation lasted approximately 90 minutes at OSU and Harvard 
and 120 minutes at UCSB. Average earnings were approximately $30 per participant.  
 
 
3. A Look at the Data   
To motivate our model and analysis, we first show some raw data on ability and beliefs, 
exploring how these measures vary by gender, category, and question difficulty. Table I 
presents summary statistics on our participants. In our sample, men are significantly more 
likely to have attended a U.S. high school, more likely to be white, and less likely to be East 
Asian. Appendix D shows that our results are similar in a more ethnically-balanced sample of 
men and women who attended high school in the U.S. 
																																																																																																																																																																												
same new block of questions in Part 2. At UCSB, we use randomization to further increase our statistical power. We 
created two 60-question blocks and randomly presented (at the session level) one block in Part 1 and one block in 
Part 2. Thus, while at OSU and Harvard our bank-specific Part 1 beliefs all refer to the same bank of questions for 
each participant, at UCSB we have bank-specific beliefs for two 10-question banks in each category for each 
participant, one elicited after Part 1 and one elicited after Part 2, where the order of presentation is randomized at 
the session level.  
10  We apply the incentive-compatible belief elicitation procedure used by Mobius, Niederle, Niehaus, and 
Rosenblatt (2014), implemented as in Coffman (2014). At Ohio State, participants see all 40 questions from Part 2 
again. For every question they are asked to provide both their believed probability they answered correctly, and 
their believed probability their partner answered correctly.  At Harvard, for 20 of the 40 Part 2 questions, (5 in each 
category faced by the participant), participants provide their believed probability of answering correctly. For the 
remaining 20 questions, they provide their believed probability of their partner answering correctly. This is done as 
a separate section of the experiment. At UCSB, we seek to maximize data collected per participant. We re-present 
all 120 questions from Parts 1 and 2 (60 for each part). For half the questions, participants provide their own 
believed probability of answering correctly. For the remaining half of the questions, in a separate block of the 
experiment, they provide their believed probability of their partner answering correctly. For each mode of belief 
elicitation, truth-telling is profit-maximizing regardless of the participant’s risk preferences (details in Appendix A).	
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In Figure I, we report actual and believed performance differences between genders. We 
have ordered the categories by their average slider scale perception, from most female-typed 
to most male-typed. The solid orange line represents the observed male advantage in 
performance in each category.11 Categories perceived to be male-typed according to the slider 
scale measure tend to also display a male advantage in performance. Female performance 
significantly exceeds male performance in Kardashians and Disney Movies.  Male 
performance significantly exceeds female performance in Cars, Videogames, Sports, Rock 
and Roll, Math, Business, and Verbal. In Art, Cooking, and Emotion, performance gaps are 
small and statistically insignificant.   
 
Table I. Summary Statistics 
 Men Women p value 
Proportion OSU Participants 0.39 0.34 0.08 
Proportion Harvard Participants 0.23 0.25 0.64 
Proportiion UCSB Participants 0.37 0.41 0.18 
    
Current Student 0.996 0.996 0.93 
Attended US High School 0.90 0.85 0.02 
Ethnicity:  
Caucasian 0.54 0.36 0.00 
East Asian 0.19 0.32 0.00 
Latino 0.11 0.12 0.69 
Black or African American 0.06 0.07 0.39 
    
N 548 508  
Notes: P-value is given for the null hypothesis of no difference between genders using a two-tailed test of 
proportions. Two participants at Ohio State dropped out when photographs were taken. One participant at Ohio 
State was caught cheating (looking up answers on the internet); she was dismissed. One participant at Ohio 
State was unable to complete the experiment due to a computer failure. All observations from these participants 
and their randomly-assigned partners are excluded from the analysis. At UCSB, we pre-registered a restriction 
to only participants who self-reported attending high school in the US and thus we exclude non-US-HS UCSB 
participants.  
 
Are perceived gaps as measured by stated beliefs in line with actual performance gaps? 
The dashed teal line reports the gender gap in belief about own ability (the difference 
between men and women’s average believed probability of answering correctly).12 The 
believed gap is in fact directionally larger than the performance gap in most categories. As 
the perceived maleness of the category rises, the gender gap in self-beliefs generally 																																																								
11 We construct a measure of average ability in a category for each individual by calculating average probability of 
answering a question correctly across all 20 questions seen in the category. Then, we take the population average of 
this average ability measure by gender and difference the male and female averages. 
12 We construct a measure of average believed own ability in a category for each individual by first computing the 
average question-specific belief for that category for the individual (averaging over all questions in that category in 
Part 3 answered by the individual) and then computing the average bank-level belief for that category for the 
individual. We then average these two measures for each individual, and take the average of this average self-belief 
measure by gender and take the difference between the male and female averages. 
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increases relative to true performance, with the largest differences coming in the more male-
typed domains of Business, Sports, Videogames, and Cars. This exaggeration of actual 
differences suggests that self-confidence may at least in part reflect stereotypes. At the same 
time, in Figure I believed performance gaps are often close to true gaps, which may suggest 
that stereotypes, while present, are weak.    
 
Figure I. Gender Differences in Performance and Self-beliefs 
Notes: Error bars reflect confidence intervals, where SEs are clustered at the individual level. Average slider 
scale perceptions are in parentheses. We construct a measure of average ability in a category for each individual 
by calculating average probability of answering a question correctly across all 20 questions seen in the category. 
Then, we take the population average of this average ability measure by gender and difference the male and 
female averages. We construct a measure of average believed own ability in a category for each individual by 
first computing the average question-specific belief for that category for the individual (averaging over all 
questions in that category in Part 3 answered by the individual) and then computing the average bank-level 
belief for that category for the individual. We then average these two measures for each individual, and take the 
average of this average self-belief measure by gender and take the difference between the male and female 
averages. 
 
The problem in making inferences from Figure I is that other belief distortions are also at 
work. To see this, consider average ability and average beliefs across genders and 
categories.13 In Figure II, we ask how stated beliefs compare with observed ability. In Panel 																																																								
13 These are computed just as in Figure I for ability and self-beliefs. We measure average believed ability of men 
(women) in a category for each individual who evaluated a known male (female) partner by first computing the 
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(a), we plot men’s average probability of answering correctly in each category, their average 
believed probability of themselves answering correctly, and the average of others’ believed 
probability of men answering correctly. The others’ belief measure averages across the 
“partner beliefs” of all individuals in the known gender treatment paired with a male partner. 
Panel (b) presents  
Figure II. Average Ability and Beliefs 
Notes: Error bars reflect confidence intervals, where SEs are clustered at the individual level. We construct a 
measure of average ability in a category for each individual by calculating average probability of answering a 
question correctly across all 20 questions seen in the category. We construct a measure of average believed own 
ability in a category for each individual by first computing the average question-specific belief for that category 
for the individual (averaging over all questions in that category in Part 3 answered by the individual) and then 
computing the average bank-level belief for that category for the individual. We then average these two 
measures for each individual. We measure average believed ability of men (women) in a category for each 
individual who evaluated a known male (female) partner by first computing the average question-specific belief 
for that category for the individual (averaging over all questions in that category in Part 3 answered by the 
individual) and then computing the average bank-level belief for that category for the individual. We then 
average these two measures for each individual, and take the average of this average partner belief measure by 
partner gender. 
																																																																																																																																																																												
average question-specific belief for that category for the individual (averaging over all questions in that category in 
Part 3 answered by the individual) and then computing the average bank-level belief for that category for the 
individual. We then average these two measures for each individual, and take the average of this average partner 
belief measure by partner gender.	
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the corresponding data for women. Categories are again ordered by the average slider scale 
perception of the category.  
Beliefs, both about oneself and others, are on average inaccurate. Weighting each 
category equally, the average probability of a correct answer for men in our sample is 0.53, 
while men’s self-beliefs average 0.59, and others believe men get it right with probability 
0.57. For women, beliefs also directionally exceed observed ability, the corresponding 
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probabilities being 0.49, 0.53 and 0.57.14  Critically, overconfidence is not just about oneself, 
but also about others. This finding is unlikely to be explained just by motivated or self-
serving beliefs.  Rather, it suggests a general overestimation of performance for these tasks.15 
Figure II also suggests that category level difficulty has predictive power for belief 
distortions.  Given the questions we chose, some areas are more difficult than others, and 
beliefs about both self and others adjust to differential difficulty.  To dig deeper into how 
beliefs depend on task difficulty, Figure III plots the average self-belief for each particular 
question, calculated separately by gender, against the average share of correct answers to that 
question, again calculated separately by gender. We split categories into three groups: the 
clearly female-typed ones (where the perception of the category and the gender gap in 
performance both point to a female advantage – Kardashians and Disney), the clearly male-
typed ones (where the perception of the category and the gender gap in performance both 
point to a male advantage – Math, Rock, Sports, Videogames, and Cars), and the ambiguous 
ones (where the perception and gender gap in performance are either noisily estimated or do 
not consistently coincide across all parts of the experiment – Cooking, Art, Emotion, Verbal, 
Business). 
We can see that question-level difficulty predicts question-level self-beliefs, both for 
men and women. We also present the 45 degree line as a point of reference. Most points fall 
above the 45 degree line, pointing to overestimation on average. As questions become easier, 
the extent of overestimation falls, with our data pointing to underestimation on average for 
the easiest questions. We also see a few cases of extreme underestimation of own ability for 
women assessing themselves in male-typed domains. In general, for both men and women, 
fitting beliefs as an affine function of true ability appears to be an appropriate approximation.  
																																																								
14 We estimate that men’s average self-beliefs significantly exceed ability (p<0.01), while beliefs about men are 
only marginally significantly greater than men’s observed ability (p=0.08). For women, the difference between 
mean self-beliefs and actual ability is smaller in magnitude but statistically significant (p<0.01), and beliefs about 
women are significantly larger than women’s observed ability (p<0.01). These p-values are generated from 
regressions that cluster at the individual level and weight each observation equally. 
15 One might worry that, in our design, beliefs about self-anchor reported beliefs about others, leading to our 
findings.  We address this concern in our question-specific beliefs in our Harvard and UCSB experiments, where we 
separately elicit beliefs about self (Part 3) and beliefs about partners in another section, and for a separate subset of 
questions. Even with this design, we observe similar levels of overestimation across own and partner ability (16 pp 
for own ability, 14 pp for ability of others for question-specific beliefs at Harvard, 9pp for own ability and 6pp for 
ability of others at UCSB).  We thus do not think that anchoring effects triggered by our design are sizable. Of 
course, people may naturally form beliefs about others by first thinking about oneself and then adjusting 
(independent of the methodology used). To the extent that this is true and we are capturing a general phenomenon, 
we see this not as a problem with our methodology but rather as a mechanism of belief formation. 	
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Figure III. Difficulty and Self-beliefs 
Each point represents a question from the dataset, marking the averaged self-belief provided for that question 
against the share of correct answers provided to that question. We do this separately for men and women. The 
solid black line is the 45 degree line; points along this line would indicate accurate average beliefs. 
 
The influence of question difficulty on beliefs raises an important challenge for assessing 
the role of stereotypes.  The reason is that average category difficulty and the gender-type of 
the category are somewhat confounded, particularly for women. Categories that are typically 
harder for women are also on average categories that are more male-typed. This is 
problematic from an identification perspective, and may lead to a masking of stereotypes in a 
naïve analysis. Stereotypes would predict underestimation of performance for women in 
male-typed categories, but those same male-typed categories may be harder for women on 
average, leading to more overestimation driven by their difficulty alone. These countervailing 
forces may generate the reasonably close correspondence between performance and belief 
gaps in Figure I. To disentangle the effects of item difficulty from stereotyping, we need a 
model that separates these factors. 
4. The Model 
There are two groups of participants, 𝐺 = 𝑀,𝐹 (for male and female) and 12 categories 
of questions, 𝐽 ∈{Kardashians, Disney, Art, Cooking, Emotion, Verbal, Business, Math, 
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Rock, Sports, Cars, Videogames}. Denote by 𝑝!,! the probability that individual 𝑖 ∈ 𝐺 answers 
the question 𝑗 ∈ 𝐽 correctly.  We assume that 𝑝!,! is given by: 𝑝!,! = 𝑝!,! + 𝑎!,! ,                                                                  (1) 
where 𝑝!,! is average performance of gender 𝐺 in the bank of 10 questions from category 𝐽 
that question j is drawn from. Component 𝑎!,!  captures individual-specific ability and 
question-specific difficulty. At the gender-category level, the definition 𝔼!" 𝑝!,! = 𝑝!,! 
imposes 𝔼!" 𝑎!,! = 0. Individual 𝑖 ∈ 𝐺 is better than the average member of group 𝐺 in 
category 𝐽  if 𝔼! 𝑎!,! > 0 .  Question 𝑗 ∈ 𝐽  is easier than the average in category 𝐽  if 𝔼! 𝑎!,! > 0. 
 
Mis-estimation of Ability and Question Difficulty  
In our data, participants systematically overestimate their performance in harder 
questions.  The cause of this phenomenon is an open question.  In a study of overconfidence 
not focused on gender, Moore and Healy (MH 2008) attribute it to imperfect information 
about individual ability. 16  Excess optimism for hard questions may also be due to a 
mechanical overweighting of low probability events, possibility related to the probability 
weighting function of Kahneman and Tversky’s Prospect Theory (1979). Alternatively, these 
distortions could be due to over-precision, or excessive confidence in the accuracy of beliefs 
(MH 2008). Because our questions are multiple-choice, an excessive confidence that one’s 
answer is correct will exactly overestimate her probability of answering correctly. A  fourth 
possibility is that people overestimate their performance due to self-serving beliefs about own 
ability, or image concerns that motivate them to view themselves favorably. Finally, the 
larger amount of overestimation for more difficult questions could be driven by noise in 
beliefs – if beliefs are random and constrained to be between 0 and 1, we would also expect 
more overestimation for the more difficult questions.  
 Here we do not seek to distinguish these mechanisms, but call this broad phenomenon 
Difficulty Induced Mis-estimation, or DIM. To measure the total role of DIM in the data, and 
to separate it from stereotypes, we specify the perceived probability 𝑝!,!!"#  of answering 
correctly to be an affine transformation of the true ability 𝑝!,!:  																																																								
16 In MH (2008), agents know their average ability in a category, but get a noisy signal of the difficulty of a 
specific question. Bayesian agents should discount the noisy signal, generating overestimation (underestimation) 
for questions that are hard (easy) relative to the agents’ expectations. The same mechanism generates similar 
patterns when assessing others.  
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𝑝!,!!"# = 𝑐 + 𝜔𝑝!,! ,                                                              2  
where 𝑐 and 𝜔 are such that beliefs always lie in 0,1 . This affine approximation appears to 
be consistent with the data presented in Figure III.  When 𝑐 > 0 and 𝜔 ∈ 0,1  participants 
overestimate ability in hard questions where 𝑝!,! is low, and may underestimate it when 𝑝!,! is 
high. Accurate estimation in easy questions occurs if 𝑐 = 1− 𝜔 > 0. 
Our belief measures for each participant come from estimation tasks, where participants 
are asked to evaluate their absolute ability (either their probability of answering correctly, or 
their score on a 10-question bank). We then classify beliefs that on average exceed observed 
ability as “overconfidence”.  In a critique of the overconfidence literature, Benoit and Dubra 
(2011) show that learning from own performance can rationally produce overplacement in 
tasks where participants are asked to evaluate themselves relative to others. That is, 𝑦% of 
subjects can rationally believe that they are in the top 𝑥% of the distribution, with 𝑦 > 𝑥.  
Our setting is not of this form. Instead, our estimation setting is closer to what Benoit and 
Dubra refer to as a “scale experiment”, where beliefs that are too high on average cannot be 
rationalized (see Theorem 3 in Benoit Dubra 2011).  
 
Stereotypes   
We model stereotypes following BCGS (2016). Consider a decision-maker trying to 
assess the distribution of some set of types in a target group, G. These types could be 
categorical, such as occupations, hair colors, or political affiliations, or ordered, such as math 
abilities, heights, or incomes. In BCGS (2016), when forecasting the distribution of types in 
some target group G, the decision-maker compares the target group to a comparison group -
G.  The model posits that the decision-maker’s beliefs about the target group are swayed by 
the representativeness heuristic (Kahneman and Tversky 1972), the tendency to overestimate 
the likelihood of types that are relatively more likely in the target group than in the 
comparison group.  
Take a simple example connected to gender. Suppose a decision maker is trying to assess 
the distribution of math abilities among men. The model postulates that the decision maker 
compares, perhaps by sampling from memory, the distribution of math abilities among men 
to the distribution from a natural comparison group, such as women. The decision maker’s 
beliefs about the abilities of men are then shifted toward the more representative types, which 
are ability levels that are relatively more frequent among men than women. For instance, if 
abilities in the two genders are normally distributed with slightly different means, the 
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representative types occur in the tails. As a result, men may be over-represented in the high-
ability tail relative to women, even if the absolute frequency of these high-ability types is 
extremely low. In this case, the decision maker swayed by representativeness would get the 
direction of the gender gap right but exaggerate its magnitude.  A tiny male advantage in 
math on average will be translated into a larger believed advantage.  
With this approach, stereotypes contain a “kernel of truth”: they exaggerate true group 
differences by focusing on the, often unlikely, features that distinguish one group from the 
other. BCGS (2016) show that beliefs about Conservatives and Liberals in the US exhibit 
such a kernel of truth: when asked to estimate the average position of a political group on an 
issue, participants get the direction of the average difference right, but overestimate its 
magnitude.17 This overestimation is larger when a party’s extreme types occur with low 
frequency in absolute terms, but high relative frequency compared to the other party.  
 In our setup, stereotypes distort the perceived ability 𝑝!,! of the average member of a 
given gender. In each question within a category 𝐽, we model each gender as distributed over 
two types: “answering correctly” and “answering incorrectly”.  Aggregating to the category 
level, for gender 𝐺 (resp. –𝐺) the probability of these types is 𝑝!,! and 1− 𝑝!,! (resp. 𝑝!!,! 
and 1− 𝑝!!,!).  Following BCGS, we say that “answering correctly” is more representative 
for group 𝐺 in category 𝐽 than “answering incorrectly” when !!,!!!!,! > !!!!,!!!!!!,!, that is, when 𝑝!,! > 𝑝!!,!. The stereotypical ability of the average member of 𝐺 in category 𝐽 is given by: 𝑝!,!!" = 𝑝!,! 𝑝!,!𝑝!!,! !" 1𝑍!,! ,                                                         (3) 
where 𝜃 ≥ 0 is a measure of representativeness-driven distortions and 𝑍!,!  is a normalizing 
factor so that 𝑝!,!!" + 1− 𝑝!,! !" = 1. Parameter 𝜎 captures the mental prominence of cross 
gender comparisons: the higher is 𝜎, the more are male-female gender comparisons top of 
mind. The case 𝜃𝜎 = 0 describes the rational agent. When 𝜃𝜎 > 0, representative types are 
overweighted.  This is different from statistical discrimination, where individuals 𝑖 ∈ 𝐺 are 
judged as the average member of gender 𝐺, overweighting 𝑝!,! relative to 𝑎!,!, but there is no 
average distortion in 𝐺.  
																																																								17 Other models, including work on naïve realism by Keltner and Robinson (1996), can generate similar 
exaggeration of differences in political and other contexts. The key distinguishing feature of our approach is its 
connection to the true distribution of underlying types, and the way representativeness serves to distort beliefs 
about these distributions. 
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When 𝑝!,! is close to 𝑝!!,!, Equation (3) can be linearly approximated as18 𝑝!,!!" = 𝑝!,! + 𝜃𝜎 𝑝!,! − 𝑝!!,! .                                                (4) 
The stereotypical belief of gender 𝐺 in category 𝐽 entails an adjustment 𝜃𝜎 𝑝!,! − 𝑝!!,!  in 
the direction of the true average gap 𝑝!,! − 𝑝!!,!  between genders. In domains where men 
are on average better than women, 𝑝!,! > 𝑝!,!, the average ability of men is overestimated 
and that of women is underestimated.   
     The effect of the gender gap in beliefs is stronger when gender comparisons are more top 
of mind, namely when 𝜎 is higher.  Although we try to reduce the prominence of gender 
comparisons in the experiment, different experimental treatments, in particular the 
assignment of a male or female partner, could be expected to influence 𝜎. 
 
Estimating Equations and Empirical Strategy 
Denote by 𝑝!,!!  the probability that person 𝑖 believes he or she has correctly answered 
question 𝑗.  We assume that belief 𝑝!,!!  is distorted by two separate influences: difficulty 
induced mis-estimation 𝑝!,!!"#  of true ability and the gender stereotype in category J.   
Formally, we write:  𝑝!,!! = 𝑐 + 𝜔 𝑝!,! + 𝑎!,! + 𝜃𝜎 𝑝!,! − 𝑝!!,! .                              (5) 
This equation nests rational expectation for 𝑐 = 𝜃𝜎 = 0 and 𝜔 = 1, in which case beliefs 
only depend on the objective gender and individual-level abilities. If 𝜃𝜎 = 0, but 𝑐 ≠ 0 or 𝜔 ≠ 1, then DIM is the only departure from rational expectations. If instead 𝜃𝜎 > 0, but 𝑐 = 0 and 𝜔 = 1, distortions are driven only by stereotypes.19 
 We use Equation (5) to organize our investigation of beliefs both at the question and 
bank levels. DIM, characterized by the constant 𝑐  and slope 𝜔 , can be identified by 
comparing beliefs to objective ability either across questions within a given category 𝐽 or 
across individuals with different abilities. This effect is orthogonal to gender stereotypes, 
which are identified by comparing beliefs across categories, controlling for question 
difficulty.  
																																																								
18 To see this, start from 𝑝!,!! = 𝑝!,! 𝑝!,! + 1 − 𝑝!,! ∙ !!!!,!!!!!!,! ! ∙ !!,!!!!,! !! !! .  Write 𝑝!,! = 𝑝!!,! + 𝜖, so that !!!!,!!!!!!,! ! ~1 − !!!!!!,! 𝜖 and !!,!!!!,! !! ~1 − !!!!,! 𝜖.  Then expand 𝑝!,!!  to first order in 𝜖 to get the result. 
19 Equation (5) can be equivalently derived by assuming that DIM applies to stereotyped beliefs, in the sense that 𝑝!,!! = 𝑐 + 𝜔 𝑝!,!!" + 𝑎!,!  . In this case, the coefficient in front of the gender gap is 𝜔𝜃𝜎 and not 𝜃𝜎. 
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We next present our estimating equations along these dimensions and discuss 
econometric issues. We have two ways of estimating the roles of DIM and stereotypes. First, 
and most directly, we can estimate Equation (5) using beliefs about own performance at the 
question level. This estimation uses the question-level beliefs data from Part 3 of the 
experiment. This approach identifies DIM from variation in question-level difficulty within 
categories, holding the category-level stereotype constant.   
The second approach is to use assessments at the category level, with the bank-level 
beliefs about own score on the 10-question bank provided following Part 1 (and Part 2 for 
UCSB participants). Using Equation (5), the belief about own performance at the category 
level (Part 1 or 2) is: 𝔼!∈! 𝑝!,!! = 𝑐 + 𝜔 𝑝!,! + 𝔼!∈! 𝑎!,! + 𝜃𝜎 𝑝!,! − 𝑝!!,! ,                   (6) 
where 𝔼!∈! 𝑝!,!!  is the average probability of answering correctly a question in category 𝐽.  
In Equation (6), the DIM parameters 𝑐 and 𝜔 are estimated using variation across individuals 
with different abilities, not across specific questions within an individual as in the question-
level estimation. Thus, Equations (5) and (6) use different sources of variation to estimate 
DIM, allowing us to assess robustness of our results. 
 We next consider beliefs about others. We focus on participants who knew the gender of 
their partner.  The belief 𝑝!!→!,!!  held by individual 𝑖′ about the performance of individual 𝑖 ∈ 𝐺 on a given question 𝑗 (Part 3) is: 𝑝!!→!,!! = 𝑐 + 𝜔 𝑝!,! + 𝔼! 𝑎!,! + 𝜃𝜎 𝑝!,! − 𝑝!!,! .                  (7) 
The term 𝔼! 𝑎!,!  reflects the fact that 𝑖′ has no specific information about the ability of 𝑖 in 
question j, so beliefs should depend on the average hit rate of gender 𝐺 for the same question. 
The average believed score out of 10 for a generic member of 𝐺 in category 𝐽 satisfies:   𝔼!∈! 𝑝!!→!,!! = 𝑐 + 𝜔𝑝!,! + 𝜃𝜎 𝑝!,! − 𝑝!!,! .                                           (8) 
Equations (7, 8) allow us to estimate beliefs about the performance of each gender using 
question-level and bank-level data, respectively. 
We follow a common empirical strategy and estimate Equations (5-8) separately for men 
and women and separately for beliefs about self and others. Allowing parameters 𝑐,𝜔, and 𝜃𝜎 to vary across genders and belief types can be informative.  For instance, this approach 
can detect differences in DIM between men and women or in beliefs about self and others 
(e.g., self-serving overconfidence should only affect self-beliefs). The stereotypes coefficient 𝜃𝜎 may be higher if gender comparisons become top of mind when the partner is revealed to 
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be of the opposite gender, or when beliefs are elicited about performance in a category as 
opposed to a specific question.   
Two main econometric issues arise when bringing specifications (5) through (8) to the 
data. Estimation relies on finding proxies for: i) the gender gap 𝑝!,! − 𝑝!!,!  in performance 
and ii) individual as well as group level ability.  We next discuss how we handle these 
explanatory variables, starting with the gender gap.   
Consider the gender gap in performance in category 𝐽. Because 𝔼!∈!,!∈! 𝑎!,! = 0, a 
proxy for the gap 𝑝!,! − 𝑝!!,!  in the data is given by the average performance gap between 
genders in the bank of 10 questions in category J.  With sufficiently large N, this measure 
should be reliable. Table II reports these performance gaps measured as the difference in the 
probability of answering a question correctly, separated by gender and category, for the two 
10-question banks in each category. Men outperform women significantly in Math, Cars, 
Rock, Sports, and Videogames in both banks while women outperform men significantly in 
Kardashians and Disney.  Gaps in the other categories are mixed. In Business and Verbal 
Skills, men outperform women by a significant margin in bank 1, but not in bank 2. In the 
other stereotypically female categories (Emotion, Art, and Cooking), performance gaps are 
small and statistically insignificant.20  
This evidence raises two issues.  First, observed gender gaps in some categories are 
small and noisily estimated, which introduces noise in our estimation of 𝜃.  Second, and 
related, stereotypes may be formed on the basis of gender gaps observed outside of our lab 
experiment – e.g. the gender gap in the broader population – which would also affect 
estimates of 𝜃. To address these concerns, we perform two robustness checks. First, we 
replace observed gaps with the slider scale perceptions provided by participants, which proxy 
for gender gaps in the broader population (Section 5.4). Second, we restrict attention to 
categories in which the gender gaps are large and stable across different measurements (see 
Appendix D). Both of these tests suggest, if anything, a marginally stronger average impact 
of stereotypes on beliefs. The fact that estimates of 𝜃 remain fairly stable for these various 
																																																								
20 Our math questions are taken from a practice test for the GMAT Exam. In 2012 – 2013, the gender gap in mean 
GMAT scores in the United States was 549 vs. 504 (out of 800). See: 
http://www.gmac.com/~/media/Files/gmac/Research/GMAT%20Test%20Taker%20Data/2013-gmat-profile-exec-
summary.pdf. Our verbal questions are taken from practice tests for the Verbal Reasoning and Writing sections of 
the SAT I. The relative performances we observe are broadly in line with other evidence.  In SAT exams, taken by 
a population in many ways similar to our lab sample, men perform better than women in math (527 vs 496 out of 
800) and perform equally in verbal questions (critical reading plus writing, 488 vs 492 out of 800), though these 
differences are not significant. 
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specifications suggests that imperfect measurement of the relevant gender gap does not pose 
a substantial threat to our analysis.     
Table II: Summary Statistics on Gender Gaps in Performance 
 Male Advantage in Prob. of Correct Answer at Question-Level 
 Average 
Gap on 
Bank 1 
(M-W) 
Average 
Gap on 
Bank 2 
(M-W) 
Average 
Gap on Both 
Banks 
(M-W) 
p value 
(Avg Gap on 
Both Banks = 0) 
Kardashians -0.105 (0.021) 
-0.169 
(0.024) 
-0.137 
(0.021) <0.001 
Disney Movies -0.142 (0.022) 
-0.084 
(0.021) 
-0.113 
(0.020) <0.001 
Art 0.002 (0.016) 
-0.026 
(0.014) 
-0.012 
(0.013) 0.33 
Cooking 0.002 (0.020) 
-0.023 
(0.019) 
-0.010 
(0.017) 0.55 
Emotion Recognition 0.024 (0.016) 
-0.013 
(0.017) 
0.006 
(0.013) 0.69 
Business 0.079 (0.022) 
-0.007 
(0.020) 
0.036 
(0.018) 0.05 
Verbal Skills 0.062 (0.020) 
0.029 
(0.020) 
0.045 
(0.018) 0.01 
Math 0.075 (0.022) 
0.045 
(0.022) 
0.060 
(0.020) 0.003 
Cars 0.099 (0.017) 
0.103 
(0.015) 
0.101 
(0.013) <0.001 
Rock and Roll 0.087 (0.019) 
0.127 
(0.020) 
0.107 
(0.017) <0.001 
Sports and Games 0.142 (0.012) 
0.142 
(0.014) 
0.142 
(0.011) <0.001 
Videogames 0.234 (0.021) 
0.161 
(0.018) 
0.197 
(0.017) <0.001 
Notes: Pools data from Ohio State, Harvard, and UCSB. Columns II – IV report the mean difference in 
probability of answering correctly across gender in the 10-question bank. The standard error on the difference is 
reported in parentheses. P-value is given for the null hypothesis of no average performance difference between 
genders using a Fisher-Pitman permutation test for two independent samples.  
 
The other component of the model is individual ability, which is also measured with 
error.  The most severe problem arises when dealing with ability in a specific question, as in 
Equation (5). We do not observe the objective individual- and question-specific ability 𝑝!,!.  
Rather, we observe whether subject 𝑖 answered question 𝑗 correctly, denoted by a dummy 𝐼!,! . 
Because 𝐼!,! is an imperfect measure of 𝑝!,!, estimating Equation (5) using 𝐼!,! involves well-
known econometric issues. First, 𝐼!,! is noisier than 𝑝!,!, which causes an attenuation bias on 
the coefficient 𝜔 on own ability.  Second, to the extent that the noise in 𝐼!,! is related to the 
gender gap in performance, it can also bias the gender gap coefficient 𝜃𝜎. 
 To address this issue, we adopt a two stage approach, instrumenting for individual 
question-specific ability. We first estimate 𝐼!,! using a set of proxies for individual-level 
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ability: the individual’s average ability in the rest of the bank excluding question 𝑗, denoted 𝑝!,!\! , and the average frequency of a correct answer to the same question 𝑗 by all other 
participants, 𝑝!∪!!\!,! . 21  These proxies do not use information about participant 𝑖 ’s 
performance on question 𝑗, but still capture her ability in the category 𝐽 and the question’s 
overall difficulty.  We implement the first stage regression: 𝐼!,! = 𝛼! + 𝛼! 𝑝!,!\! + 𝛼!𝑝!∪!!\!,! + 𝛼! 𝑝!,! − 𝑝!!,!                                 (9) 
where the gender gap 𝑝!,! − 𝑝!!,! is also included as a regressor. The fitted values 𝐼!,! of the 
above regressions are then used as proxies for true individual- and question-specific ability 𝑝!,!. Instrumenting helps us reduce biases due to noisy ability measurement while preserving 
the interpretation of coefficients as distortions due to stereotypes or DIM.22 
 Finally, ability at the category level, necessary to estimate Equations (6), (7) and (8), is 
proxied for with its sample counterpart. Thus 𝑝!,! + 𝔼!∈! 𝑎!,!  in Equation (6) is proxied 
by the share of correct answers obtained by individual 𝑖 in category 𝐽. Similarly, the ability 
measures in Equations (7) and (8) are proxied by the share of correct answers by gender 𝐺 in 
question 𝑗 and in category 𝐽, respectively. 
 
 
5. Determinants of Beliefs 
5.1 Beliefs about own performance 
Table III reports the results from specifications (5) and (6) on self-beliefs. Columns I and 
II use Part 3 question-level data to estimate Equation (5). We capture ability using the fitted 
values 𝐼!,! described above; first stage estimates appear in Appendix C. Columns III and IV 
present the estimates of Equation (6) using bank-level beliefs. To interpret the coefficients in 
probability points, we rescale bank-level beliefs (and all inputs) to a probability scale by 
dividing by 10. 
In three of the four specifications, we identify a significant role for stereotypes in 
shaping beliefs about self. For women, the effects are consistent. Specifications II and IV 
both suggest that, holding own true ability fixed, a 5 percentage point increase in male 																																																								21	Alternatively,	one	could	use	the	share	of	correct	answers	to	question	j	by	only	participants	of	the	same	gender,	𝑝!\!,! .	The	results	of	Table	III	are	robust	to	this	alternative	specification.		
22 In Appendix C, we perform a robustness check of the two-stage approach described above.  We separately add the 
proxies for individual ability, 𝑝!,!\! and 𝑝!∪!!\!,! to Equation (5). This provides a simpler method to pinning down 
the effect of stereotypes; however, we lose the interpretation of 𝑐 and 𝜔. Estimated coefficients 𝜃𝜎 on the gender 
gaps are very similar to the two-stage estimates.  
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advantage in a category (roughly the size of moving from a gender-neutral category to a 
moderately male-typed category like math), decreases beliefs of own ability by between 2.2 
percentage points (bank-level estimate) to 2.5 percentage points (question-level estimate).  
For men, the results are less consistent: in the question-level data, we identify no 
significant effect of stereotypes on men’s self-beliefs. In the bank-level data, men’s self-
beliefs are shaped by stereotypes, though by a smaller amount than women’s self-beliefs: we 
estimate that an increase of 5 percentage points in the male advantage in a category increases 
a man’s belief of answering correctly by 1.1 percentage points. In an interacted model, we 
estimate a stronger impact of stereotypes on women’s self-beliefs than on men’s self-beliefs 
(p<0.01 in both the question-level and bank-level data). This evidence indicates that self-
beliefs of women, and to a weaker extent of men, are influenced by stereotypes in the specific 
sense of the kernel of truth: they reflect, but overestimate, true gender differences.  
Table III: Self-beliefs 
Question-Level Self-beliefs – Equation (5) 
Two-Stage Least Squares Predicting Own 
Believed Probability of Answering a Question 
Correctly 
Bank-Level Self-beliefs – Equation (6) 
OLS Predicting Own 
Believed Score in Bank on scale of 0 to 1 
 
 Para-
meter 
I 
(Men) 
II 
(Women) 
 Para-
meter 
III 
(Men) 
IV 
(Women) 
Own Gender 
Advantage  
𝜃𝜎 -0.039 
(0.026) 
0.49**** 
(0.028) 
Own 
Gender 
Advantage  
𝜃𝜎 0.21**** 
(0.033) 
0.44**** 
(0.046) 
Own Ability 
- Fitted 
Value of 𝐼!,!  𝜔 0.60**** (0.011) 0.61**** (0.011) Own Ability –Own 
Average 
Probability 
of Correct 
Answer in 
Bank 
𝜔 0.71**** 
(0.018) 
0.71**** 
(0.020) 
Constant  c 0.33**** 
(0.009) 
0.30**** 
(0.009) 
Constant  c 0.12**** 
(0.012) 
0.10**** 
(0.012) 
Clusters  548 504 Clusters  548 504 
N  23,438 21,840 N  3,824 3,680 
Notes: Pools observations for Ohio State, Harvard, and UCSB. Standard errors clustered at the individual level. 
Own gender advantage in both specifications is measured as the average gender difference in the probability of 
a correct answer on the bank of questions that the question is drawn from, coded so that a positive sign reflects 
an own gender advantage.  Own ability for question-level data is the fitted value of 𝐼!,! from Equation (9), and, 
in bank-level data, own ability is an individual’s average probability of answering correctly in the bank. Bank-
level beliefs and inputs are re-scaled to a 0 to 1 scale – that is, while an individual predicts her score on a 0 – 10 
scale, we divide that belief by 10 here, so that all coefficients can be interpreted in probability points. 
 
Notably, DIM is also an important determinant of self-beliefs held by both men and 
women.  We estimate 𝜔 < 1 (p<0.001) and 𝑐 > 0 in all specifications, strongly rejecting the 
null of rational expectations (𝑐 = 𝜃 = 0 , 𝜔 = 1 ). Participants overestimate their own 
performance for difficult questions and underestimate it slightly for easy questions, as 𝑐 + 𝜔 < 1  (p<0.001). In question-level data, absent a distortion from stereotyping, we 
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estimate that men overestimate own performance for questions where own ability is less than 
or equal to 0.83, and women overestimate own performance for questions where own ability 
is less than 0.77. DIM distortions are smaller in bank-level than in question-level beliefs (𝑐 is 
lower and 𝜔 is higher in Columns III and IV than in Columns I and II).23  
When we compare genders, running an interacted model, we estimate a somewhat 
smaller c for women than for men (p<0.01 in the question-level data, n.s. in the bank-level 
data), but no significant differences in 𝜔. Thus, no clear gender differences in DIM emerge in 
our data on self-beliefs. While it is difficult to compare this result directly with the earlier 
work that has not separated DIM from other sources of belief distortions, such as stereotypes, 
the null finding is consistent with the evidence of limited gender differences in 
overconfidence in neutral-typed categories. In our data, significant gender differences occur 
in categories with sizable gender gaps due to stereotypes.   
 
5.2 Beliefs about others’ performance 
Table IV reports estimates of Equations (7) and (8) for beliefs about others’ performance 
on individual questions (Columns I and II) and at the bank-level (Columns III and IV). We 
use data from participants who knew their partner’s gender, and we pool all evaluators, 
without keeping track of their gender. In Appendix C we show effects separately by gender 
of the evaluator, finding no consistent differences in how men and women evaluate others. 
There are many similarities between Table IV estimates and the self-beliefs estimates of 
Table III. Just as in the self-beliefs data, we estimate a significant role for stereotypes in three 
out of the four specifications. When evaluating women, stereotypes play a consistent and 
non-trivial role in shaping beliefs. Just as increases in male advantage decrease women’s 
beliefs of own ability, increases in male advantage also decrease others’ beliefs of women’s 
ability. This effect is of roughly the same magnitude in the question-level data: a 5pp increase 
in male advantage decreases beliefs of female ability by 2.4pp.  In the bank-level beliefs, the 
effects are smaller than the effects for self-beliefs, but still significant: an increase in male 
advantage of 5pp is estimated to decrease beliefs of female ability by 0.7 pp. The evidence on 
the role of stereotypes for beliefs about men is mixed, just as it was for self-beliefs.  In the 
bank-level data, stereotypes are quite strong, shaping beliefs about men as predicted by the 
																																																								
23 This is consistent with the Moore and Healy mechanism (subjects perceive a more precise signal of average 
difficulty after observing 10 questions than after observing a single question) and with overestimation of small 
probabilities (which exerts a smaller distortion on the average score from several questions). 
	 27	
model, just as they did for self-beliefs.  In question-level data, we estimate no significant 
effect. 
Table IV: Beliefs about Others 
Question-Level Beliefs – Equation (7) 
OLS Predicting Belief of Partner’s Probability 
of Answering a Question Correctly 
Bank-Level Beliefs – Equation (8) 
OLS Predicting Belief of Partner’s Score 
on scale of 0 to 1 
 Para-
meter 
I 
(Beliefs 
About 
Men) 
II 
(Beliefs 
About 
Women) 
 Para-
meter 
III 
(Beliefs 
About 
Men) 
IV 
(Beliefs 
About 
Women) 
Partner’s 
Gender 
Advantage 
𝜃𝜎 0.02 
(0.027) 
0.48**** 
(0.037) 
Partner’s 
Gender 
Advantage 
𝜃𝜎 0.45**** 
(0.052) 
0.14** 
(0.055) 
Partner Ability - 
Share of 
Partner’s 
Gender 
Answering Qn. 
Correctly 
𝜔 0.34**** 
(0.013) 
0.33**** 
(0.016) 
Partner Ability - 
Partner’s 
Gender Average 
Probability of 
Correct Answer 
in Bank 
𝜔 0.64**** 
(0.043) 
0.62**** 
(0.037) 
Constant  c 0.40**** 
(0.010) 
0.43**** 
(0.012) 
Constant  c 0.16**** 
(0.024) 
0.21**** 
(0.021) 
Clusters  395 398 Clusters  395 398 
N  18,020 18,179 N  2,590 2,630 
Notes: Includes data only from participants who knew the gender of their partner at the time of providing the 
belief. Pools observations for Ohio State, Harvard, and UCSB. Standard errors clustered at the individual level. 
Partner gender advantage in both specifications is measured as the average gender difference in the probability 
of a correct answer on the bank of questions that the question is drawn from, coded so that a positive sign 
reflects an advantage for the partner’s gender. Partner ability for question-level data is share of individuals of 
partner’s gender that answered that question correctly and, in bank-level data, partner ability is the average 
probability of answering correctly in the 10-question bank by members of the partner’s gender. Note that bank-
level beliefs and inputs are re-scaled to a 0 to 1 scale – that is, while an individual predicts her partner’s score on 
a 0 – 10 scale, we divide that belief by 10 here, so that all coefficients can be interpreted in probability points. 
 
DIM also plays a role in beliefs about others, as participants overestimate ability on hard 
questions and slightly underestimate it on easy ones.  These belief distortions are 
directionally more severe here than in the case of self-beliefs (particularly on hard questions).  
This finding could be explained by the Moore Healy mechanism, because signals of difficulty 
for others are presumably noisier than those for self.  This finding shows clearly that the 
overestimation of own performance we observe in our data is not only due to conventional 
self-serving biases. 
When evaluating others, DIM plays a larger role in the assessment of women than of 
men. In both question-level and bank-level beliefs, we estimate a larger c when evaluating 
women than when evaluating men (p<0.05 in question-level data, p<0.10 in bank-level data), 
suggesting in general more overestimation of female ability than of male ability. While 𝜔 is 
directionally smaller when assessing women than men, these differences are not significant.   
Most past studies on overconfidence, with the notable exception of Moore and Healy 
(2008), explore beliefs about others in the context of placement questions, asking participants 
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to rank themselves relative to others. While this is an important and interesting line of 
inquiry, placement questions do not allow the researcher to infer whether beliefs about others 
are also inflated relative to the truth. Our data suggests that ‘overconfident’ beliefs are not 
unique to self-assessments. Note that this is not necessarily inconsistent with past evidence 
on over-placement, as beliefs about self could still exceed beliefs about others, even if both 
are inflated relative to the truth. We explore the connection between beliefs about absolute 
and relative ability in Section 6.  
 
5.3 Taking Stock of Stereotypes and DIM 
What do our model and data have to say about gender gaps in confidence? We can use 
our estimates to shed light on this question. As a metric for this assessment, we propose the 
male overconfidence gap, or MOG, defined as the difference between male and female 
overconfidence: MOG = [(Average Male Self-belief – Average Male Ability) – (Average 
Female Self-belief – Average Female Ability)]. This measure increases as men become more 
overconfident (or less underconfident) about themselves relative to women. In line with our 
initial motivation, this measure captures the extent to which self-assessments of confidence 
tend to favor men over women relative to real ability.     
Our estimates allow us to assess the value of MOG under two counterfactuals, shedding 
light on the sources of gender differences in overconfidence. We focus on question-level 
data, as in Columns I and II of Table III. In the first counterfactual, we estimate MOG by 
assuming that only DIM is at work by computing a set of individual self-beliefs under the 
assumption that 𝜃𝜎 = 0. That is, we compute a “DIM-only” self-belief by first using the first-
stage regression in Equation (9) to construct the fitted value of individual question-specific 
ability, 𝐼!,!, and then feeding that value into the model of Table III:  𝑐 + 𝜔 𝐼𝑖,𝑗 + 𝜃𝜎 𝑝!,! − 𝑝!!,!  
where we set 𝑐 = 0.33 , 𝜔 = 0.60 , and 𝜃𝜎 = 0  for men, and 𝑐 = 0.30 , 𝜔 = 0.61 , and 𝜃𝜎 = 0 for women. This produces a set of DIM-only counterfactual self-beliefs, which we 
can then use to construct the DIM-only MOG in each category, subtracting observed average 
ability from average DIM-only self-beliefs for each gender, and taking the difference of these 
differences. 
In the second counterfactual, we compute a set of individual self-beliefs under the 
assumption that only stereotypes are at work, using the same first-stage regression to produce 𝐼!,! but then feeding it into the Table III model with 𝑐 = 0,𝜔 = 1, and 𝜃𝜎 = −0.039 (for 
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men) or 𝜃𝜎 = 0.49 (for women). We use this set of counterfactual self-beliefs to construct 
the “Stereotypes-only” MOG for each category. In Table V, we present these counterfactual 
MOGs, juxtaposed with the observed MOG in our data in the final column. 
 
Table V. Predicted  Gender Gaps in Overconfidence 
Category (I) 
DIM-only Prediction 
of Gender Gap in 
Overconfidence 
(M-F) 
(II) 
Stereotypes-only 
Prediction 
of Gender Gap in 
Overconfidence 
(M-F) 
(III) 
Observed 
Gender Gap in 
Overconfidence 
(M-F) 
Kardashians 0.078 -0.063 0.028 
Disney 0.070 -0.046 0.024 
Art 0.033 -0.018 0.021 
Cooking 0.028 -0.006 0.042 
Emotion 0.034 0.002 0.040 
Verbal 0.016 0.019 -0.004 
Business 0.028 -0.005 0.063 
Math 0.008 0.022 0.022 
Rock -0.018 0.043 0.025 
Sports -0.032 0.062 0.038 
Videogames -0.051 0.093 0.061 
Cars -0.015 0.045 0.033 
Notes: We generate the DIM-only predictions by constructing a DIM-only question-level self-belief for each 
individual in the dataset. This uses the estimates presented in Table III, but sets 𝜃𝜎 = 0. Once we have 
generated this set of DIM-only beliefs for each individual, we use them to construct the counterfactual male 
overconfidence gap (or MOG) by taking the average DIM-only self-belief for men (women), differencing out 
observed average male (female) ability, and then subtracting female overconfidence from male overconfidence. 
We follow the same approach for the Stereotypes-Only counterfactual, again using the estimates from Table III, 
but this time setting 𝑐 = 0,𝜔 = 1. The final column presents the observed MOG in our data, using observed 
self-beliefs for men and women and observed ability for the question-level data.  
 
If only DIM distorted beliefs (Column I), men's overconfidence would exceed women's 
in all six of the female-typed domains. This is because, on average, questions in these female-
typed domains are harder for men than for women (in the sense that women’s scores are 
lower than men’s), leading to more male overconfidence. Conversely, in the male-typed 
domains of videogames, sports, rock, and cars, where questions are on average harder for 
women than for men, the DIM-only counterfactual predicts greater female than male 
overconfidence. Thus, the trend in the DIM-only counterfactual predicts greater gender gaps 
in overconfidence in favor of women exactly as the maleness of the domain increases. This of 
course is directly at odds with the observed trend in our data (Column III). A DIM-only 
perspective clearly misses an important component of beliefs. 
When only stereotypes distort beliefs (Column II), the predictions are almost exactly the 
opposite of the DIM-only model: the largest gap in overconfidence in favor of women 
obtains for Kardashians (6pp), the largest gap in favor of men obtains for Videogames (9pp). 
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While the trend toward predicting a larger gender gap in favor of men as category maleness 
increases is in line with the observed data, the stereotypes-only model is too extreme.  
The pattern in the data is a small but rather consistent gender gap in overconfidence in 
favor of men. While these gender gaps are positively correlated with observed gaps in 
performance as predicted by stereotypes (correlation of 0.28), this correlation is muted by the 
countervailing force of DIM, which generates greater overconfidence in the more difficult 
(and on average less gender congruent) domains for each gender. A correct model of the 
sources of gender gaps in overconfidence must include these two distinct but key 
components. Relying only on the evidence of Figure I, without separating DIM and 
stereotypes, leads to erroneous conclusions on the consequences of gender stereotypes.    
At a broad level, our analysis indicates that lack of female self-confidence in certain 
tasks such as math does not arise because of their difficulty. If anything, difficulty would lead 
women – just like everybody else – to be overconfident. Rather, women seem relatively 
under-confident in difficult topics when these are stereotypically male, in the sense that they 
display a male advantage in performance. Here stereotypes play a key role. 
Two questions remain open.  First, does the kernel of truth capture a large chunk of 
variation in category-level stereotypes, or are there other mechanisms creating category-level 
gender stereotypes that are not considered here?  Second, since DIM is important in the data, 
what are the forces behind it? While our experiment was not designed to examine the sources 
of DIM, our estimation results are somewhat informative. 
We can assess the explanatory power of the kernel of truth by examining the correlation 
between the slider scale measure of stereotypes, which in principle incorporates several of 
their determinants, with the true gender gap in performance. The slider scale perceptions are 
very highly correlated with the observed gender gap in performance (corr = 0.92), with the 
average gender gap in self-beliefs (corr = 0.93), and with the gender gap in beliefs about 
others (0.94). This tight connection between the perception of male advantage, true 
performance gaps, and beliefs about ability shows that the kernel of truth hypothesis has 
strong explanatory power for category-level gender stereotypes. This evidence lends support 
to the BCGS (2016) theory of stereotypes.  
With respect to the drivers of DIM, one possibility is that beliefs are unbiased but noisily 
reported on a constrained interval. This would lead to overestimation of performance for hard 
questions and underestimation for easy ones, and the effects would be concentrated in the 
extremes.  One problem of this hypothesis is that random beliefs would not be correlated with 
actual ability, contrary to the evidence. In addition, self-beliefs on question level performance 
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suggests a preponderance of overestimation, even for average questions, and little if any 
underestimation for easier questions (see Table III, in which approximately 𝑐 = 0.3 and 𝜔 = 0.6 for either gender).  In fact, in 21% of the observations, subjects state they are 100% 
sure their answer is correct. This last argument also goes against an explanation based on a 
mechanical overweighting of small probabilities, possibly related to the probability weighting 
function of Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). 
A second possibility is that the data reflects motivated beliefs, but we already argued that 
the data does not support this possibility. In contrast, the estimates show robust 
overestimation of others’ performance (similar in magnitude to that for self-beliefs), 
suggesting that motivated beliefs are unlikely to be a first order factor in our data.  
A third possibility is that beliefs about performance are regressive to expectations of 
performance, as proposed by Moore and Healy (2008). This can account for significant 
overestimation for harder than expected questions, and underestimation for easier than 
expected ones.  We do not have data on expectations of difficulty, but this pattern is 
consistent with broad overestimation if most questions are harder than expected, which is 
plausible in a trivia task. The model similarly predicts that beliefs about others are more 
regressive (because information on others’ ability is noisier), which is directionally true in 
our estimates.  
A related source of belief distortions is over-precision, defined as an excessive 
confidence in the accuracy of beliefs (MH 2008): to the extent that a participant strictly 
prefers one answer to another, overconfidence about the precision of their knowledge is 
exactly the overestimation of the likelihood of a correct answer.  In our experiment, we do 
not elicit confidence in beliefs, so we cannot test this channel directly. Unlike overestimation, 
however, over-precision need not automatically lead to inflated beliefs about aggregate 
performance on a set of questions.   
 
5.4 Exploring the Stability of 𝜽 
As we discussed after presenting Table II, one challenge in estimating the role of 
stereotypes in our data is the fact that our estimates rely on observed performance gaps in our 
sample. Noise in estimating these gaps may introduce imprecision in our estimates.  
One way to explore the extent to which this concern impacts our findings is to estimate 
the model using the slider scale perceptions provided by participants at the end of the 
experiment. Recall that the slider scale asks participants to indicate on a scale from -1 to 1 the 
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extent to which either women or men generally know more about the category, which we 
interpret as a proxy for the gender gaps people have in mind. While these perceptions are 
likely tainted by stereotypes, they also contain information about the true gender performance 
gaps that generate beliefs. 
In Appendix Tables A.15 and A.16, we replicate Table III on self-beliefs and Table IV 
on beliefs about others, but replacing the observed gender gap with the participant’s slider 
scale perception of the gap.  While one cannot directly compare magnitudes across the tables 
(the slider scale perception is measured on a different scale than the observed true gaps), we 
find qualitatively similar patterns. Again, for women’s beliefs about self and other’s beliefs 
about women, we estimate a consistent role for stereotyping. To give a rough sense of 
magnitudes, consider women’s question-level self-beliefs. Using observed gaps in Table III, 
we estimate that an increase of male advantage of 5pp, roughly the size of the male advantage 
in math, decreases self-beliefs by approximately 2.5pp. In the slider scale specifications, 
moving from 0 to a slider scale perception of 0.20 in favor of men on the -1 to 1 scale, 
roughly the perception of advantage in math, is estimated to decrease self-beliefs by 1.8pp.  
In the estimates using observed gaps, the only cases in which we failed to find a role for 
stereotyping was in question-level beliefs for men (both men’s self-beliefs and beliefs about 
men). Replacing true gaps with the slider scale perceptions leads to estimates of a 
directionally positive, but insignificant, impact of stereotyping in question-level self-beliefs 
for men, and a significant positive impact of stereotyping in question-level beliefs about men. 
In sum, noisily estimated gaps are unlikely to exert a substantial impact on our findings 
on stereotypes. The results are robust, and if anything slightly stronger, when replacing these 
gaps with the slider scale measures. This is likely due to the fact that our stereotype estimates 
are largely shaped by the more ‘extreme’ domains at both ends of the gender-type spectrum, 
where true gaps are significant, sizable, and consistently estimated. In Appendix D, we 
present an alternative approach by showing that our results are very similar when we restrict 
attention only to domains in which actual performance gaps are sizable.  We show that this 
holds if we restrict to domains where gaps are at least 5pp, or at least 10pp. Our main results 
(consistent effects of stereotypes for women’s beliefs, less consistent effects for men’s 
beliefs) are also similar when restricting the analysis to the data from the UCSB experiment, 
which included the strongest female and male-typed domains. Estimates of stereotyping seem 
to be effectively pinned down whenever large performance gaps in favor of each gender are 
considered simultaneously. Estimates of 𝜃 from other populations and contexts, particularly 
those that increase (or decrease) the salience of gender comparisons, could vary in 
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magnitude. Our main message is that “kernel of truth” stereotypes play an important role in 
shaping self-assessments and beliefs about others, and we offer one tractable model and 
methodology for isolating and documenting these effects.   
 
5.5 Self-beliefs and Context 
The previous sections show that stereotypes shape beliefs about own and others’ ability 
in our data.  Are these belief distortions constant or do they predictably depend on certain 
features of the environment?  The answer to this question is both interesting and important.  
If there are ways to frame the environment so that gender stereotypes do not come to mind, 
then perhaps it is possible to render beliefs more accurate. Our model implies that context 
matters.  In particular, the strength of stereotype distortions should depend on the extent to 
which gender is top of mind when assessing performance, as captured by parameter 𝜎 in 
Equation (4).  When gender is more top of mind, 𝜎 is higher, beliefs should become more 
stereotypical. 
This context dependence of beliefs is a broader feature of the “kernel of truth” theory of 
stereotypes. Because beliefs exaggerate differences relative to a comparison group, beliefs 
can be changed by changing the comparison group one has in mind.  According to cognitive 
psychology, stereotypes are focused on “group features that are the most distinctive, that 
provide the greatest differentiation between groups” (Hilton and Von Hippel 1996). BCGS 
(2016) provide experimental evidence that exogenously changing the comparison set changes 
beliefs about a given set of mundane objects, in the precise sense implied by the kernel of 
truth.  
To test this prediction of BCGS (2016), we next examine the effect of revealing the 
gender of one’s partner. We do so in two steps.  In this section, we assess how having a 
known partner of the opposite gender impacts self-beliefs about own absolute performance in 
Part 1.24  In the next section, we assess how knowing a partner’s gender shapes team 
performance in the place in line game.  In a rational model the predictions are clear:  for self-
beliefs, knowledge of a partner’s gender should exert no effect. This prediction is shared by 
any model of stable, context independent, beliefs. For the place in line game, knowledge of a 
partner’s gender should actually improve performance by revealing information about 
																																																								
24 A related literature on “Stereotype threat” (Steele and Aronson 1995, Spencer, Steele, and Quinn 1999) posits 
that highlighting gender comparisons reduces actual performance. However, in our experiment beliefs are 
elicited after performance, so gender comparisons primed by the treatment work only through beliefs. 
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expected relative ability in different categories.  We show that the evidence does not support 
these predictions.  
 We note upfront that our treatment effects may be reduced by the nature of our 
implementation.  While the subtlety of our gender revelation limits concerns about 
experimenter demand effects, it may also lead to an underestimation of the effects that could 
be obtained through more prominent framing.  Furthermore, to the extent that subjects 
already have gender comparisons in mind absent the revelation of partner gender, we may 
also see more limited treatment effects.25 
          We start with self-beliefs.    In Table VI, we repeat the specifications of Table III in 
Section 5.1 but restrict the sample to individuals who know partner’s gender at the time of 
reporting the question-level or bank-level belief. We include a dummy for a known female 
partner and interact it with own gender advantage. If having a partner of the opposite gender 
causes gender comparisons to become more top of mind (i.e., if 𝜎 increases), beliefs about 
self should be more strongly shaped by gender gaps.  Thus subjects paired with women, 
relative to subjects paired with men, should become relatively more optimistic about own 
performance as male advantage increases.  This would translate into a positive interaction of 
female partner and own gender advantage for men and the reverse for women. 
 
Table VI: Self-beliefs with Context Dependence 
Question-Level Beliefs 
Two-Stage Least Squares Predicting Own Believed 
Probability of Answering a Question Correctly 
Bank-Level Beliefs 
OLS Predicting Own 
Believed Score on 0 to 1 Scale 
 Para-
meter 
I 
(Men) 
II 
(Women) 
 Para-
meter 
III 
(Men) 
IV 
(Women) 
Own Gender 
Adv.  
𝜃𝜎 -0.10*** 
(0.036) 
0.61**** 
(0.038) 
Own Gender 
Adv.  
𝜃𝜎 0.11** 
(0.054) 
0.51**** 
(0.067) 
Own Ability - 
Fitted Value of 𝐼!,! 𝜔 0.60**** (0.013) 0.59**** (0.012) Own Ability –Own Average Probability of 
Correct Answer 
in Bank 
𝜔 0.71**** 
(0.021) 
0.69**** 
(0.022) 
Partner Female  -0.021* 
(0.012) 
0.021* 
(0.012) 
Partner Female  -0.014 
(0.013) 
0.000 
(0.013) 
Partner Female x 
Own Gender 
Adv.  
 0.045 
(0.054) 
-0.15*** 
(0.056) 
Partner Female x 
Own Gender 
Adv.  
 0.12 
(0.076) 
-0.068 
(0.082) 
Constant  c 0.34**** 
(0.013) 
0.30**** 
(0.010) 
Constant  c 0.12**** 
(0.016) 
0.11**** 
(0.015) 																																																								25	This	could	be	due	to	a	number	of	reasons,	including	that	subjects see (and hear) a mix of men and women 
in the lab, and that subjects are prompted to assess performance in topics that are strongly gendered.	
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Clusters  401 392 Clusters  401 392 
N  18,359 17,840 N  2,612 2,608 
Notes: Pools observations for Ohio State, Harvard, and UCSB. Standard errors clustered at the individual level. 
Uses only observations for individuals who knew their partner’s gender at the time of the belief elicitation. Own 
gender advantage in both specifications is measured as the average gender difference in the probability of a 
correct answer on the bank of questions that the question is drawn from, coded so that a positive sign reflects an 
own gender advantage.  Own ability for question-level data is the fitted value of 𝐼!,! from Equation (9), and, in 
bank-level data, own ability is an individual’s average probability of answering correctly in the bank. Note that 
bank-level beliefs are re-scaled to a 0 to 1 scale – that is, while an individual predicts her score on a 0 – 10 scale, 
we divide that belief by 10 here, so that all coefficients can be interpreted in probability points. 
 
The evidence is directionally consistent with the predictions. The effects are in general 
not statistically significant, which may be because the treatment only weakly increases the 
salience of gender comparisons but may also be due to the lower sample size (and lower 
statistical power) relative to Table III. 26  To increase statistical power, in Appendix C4, we 
pool the data for both male and female participants who knew the gender of their partner, 
regressing self-beliefs on male advantage in the category, a dummy for female partner, and 
the interaction of these two terms. The estimated interaction is of similar magnitude to Table 
VI, and is now significant in question-level data and marginally significant in bank-level 
data.27   
To give a sense of magnitudes, we estimate that a woman moving from a gender neutral 
category to a moderately male-typed category such as math (male advantage of 0.05) reduces 
her believed probability of answering correctly by approximately 2.4pp when paired with a 
woman and by 2.9pp when paired with a man. Appendix C4, Table A6 shows that this effect 
is not limited to gender: among the sample of participants who received photographs of their 
partner, partner ethnicity has an impact on self-beliefs. 
The evidence thus points to context dependence in our data.  More detailed tests of the 
kernel of truth hypothesis and the context dependence of gender stereotypes would involve 
finding stronger ways of varying the salience of gender, in particular of reducing gender 
comparisons for subjects paired within their own gender.  For example, evidence suggests 
that women educated at single-sex schools display little if any under-confidence in math 
(Fryer and Levitt 2010, Booth and Nolen 2012), perhaps because the gender comparison is 
less salient given their experience.  
 
 
																																																								26	Reading across columns I – IV, the p-values on the interaction of interest are 0.40, 0.007, 0.11, and 0.41.	27	In	question-level data, the estimated interaction is 0.096 (SE of 0.039, p-value<0.05).  In bank level data, the 
estimated interaction is 0.095 (SE of 0.056, p-value=0.10). See Appendix C4, Table A5 for details.	
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6. Beliefs of Relative Ability and the Consequences for Decision-Making 
Our model and our data deal with beliefs of absolute ability: one’s own and partner’s 
believed probability of answering correctly. In many decision-making contexts, however, the 
beliefs of relative ability may be most predictive. Decisions whether to compete in a 
tournament are a function of whether an individual believes she can beat others; decisions 
whether to apply for a job or promotion are likely to be a function of believed rank within the 
pool of potential candidates.  It is then important to check how the patterns in believed 
absolute ability we identify translate into beliefs of relative ability. In this section, we first 
document how the determinants of beliefs explored in Section 5 – DIM, stereotypes, and 
context dependence – combine to produce gender differences in beliefs of relative ability.  
We then take this analysis from beliefs to strategic decisions within a group, and examine 
how our participants make decisions about when to contribute ideas.  
In Figure IV, we present data on beliefs about relative ability, focusing on both partner 
gender and category. For each participant who knows the gender of their partner at the time 
of belief elicitation, we construct the gap in average beliefs about own ability and average 
beliefs about partner’s ability at the category level, weighting the bank-level and question-
level data equally. We ask how this believed ability gap between self and partner varies with 
partner gender and category. Panel (a) presents believed relative ability for men with male 
partners in blue and with female partners in red. Panel (b) presents the same measures for 
women. In both  
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Figure IV. Believed Relative Ability 
Notes: Error bars reflect confidence intervals, where SEs are clustered at the individual level. 
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graphs, we have also added the true gender difference in performance as the dotted green line 
for reference. Accurate beliefs for an individual paired with a same gender partner would 
average 0 in each category; accurate beliefs for an individual paired with an opposite gender 
partner would average the true gender difference in performance – the dotted green line. 
Figure IV shows that the patterns of beliefs documented in Section 5 have important 
implications for beliefs about relative ability. For men paired with male partners, believed 
relative ability is relatively flat across the categories. If anything, men paired with male 
partners are relatively more confident in clearly female-typed categories (by an average of 
4pp) than in clearly male-typed categories (by an average of -1pp).28 For men paired with 
female partners, the pattern is reversed. Men believe they are less knowledgeable than their 
female partners in the clearly female-typed categories (by 9pp on average), and more 
knowledgeable than their female partners in male-typed categories (by 9pp on average).29 
Relative to the accurate beliefs benchmark, men are not exaggerating the gender gap in 
performance – if anything, they underestimate the extent of their advantage over women in 
many of the male-typed domains.  
When paired with male partners, women believe that they outperform their partner in the 
female-typed categories, by 19pp on average, but believe that they are outperformed by their 
partner in the male-typed categories – by 20pp.30 For the extreme categories, there is 
exaggeration relative to the true gap (green dotted line). When women are paired with 
women, relative beliefs vary less with the category, hovering closer to 0.  
These patterns suggest that decisions are likely to be a function of gender stereotypes, 
reflected in responsiveness to both the domain, the gender of one’s partner, and the 
interaction of the two. We find evidence for this in our data from the place in line game, 
where measured beliefs are strongly predictive of willingness to contribute.31 Here, we focus 
on the implications of stereotyped beliefs for group performance that follows from place in 
line decisions.  																																																								
28 If we regress believed relative ability for men paired with male partners on the gender-type of the category, we 
can reject that believed relative ability is the same across gender-type with p<0.01. The point estimates and p-value 
are unchanged if we include all categories (using slider scale to classify male versus female) or only those that are 
clearly male or female-typed as defined in Section 3. 
29 If we regress believed relative ability for men paired with female partners on the gender-type of the category, 
restricting to clearly male or female-typed, we can reject that believed relative ability is the same across gender-type 
with p<0.01. If we instead include all categories, the point estimates are 5pp and 8pp, respectively, p<0.01. 
30 These estimates are both significantly different from 0, p<0.001, and from each other, p<0.001. Point estimates 
using all categories are 11p and 19pp, p-value statements unchanged. 
31 This is a replication of the findings of Coffman (2014), who finds that beliefs about self and beliefs about partner 
strongly predict willingness to contribute answers in a very similar paradigm. Appendix Tables A.7 and A.8 in 
Appendix C explore this relationship in our data, regressing place in line from ability, male advantage in the 
category, partner gender, and beliefs.   
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We say that a participant “contributes” her answer if she submits a place in line at least 
as close to the front as her partner. Women contribute 59% of their answers when paired with 
male partners and 68% of their answers when paired with female partners (p<0.001).32 These 
differences are largely driven by the clearly male-typed categories – across which women 
contribute 66% of their answers when paired with women but only 44% when paired with 
men (p<0.001). We see a smaller but directionally similar discrepancy for men: men 
contribute 73% of their answers when paired with female partners but 68% of their answers 
when paired with male partners (p<0.05). Again, most of the difference stems from clearly 
male-typed categories, where the difference is 83% with female partners versus 67% with 
male partners (p<0.001). 
These contribution decisions have implications for group performance. We measure 
group performance as the fraction of questions for which a group submits the correct answer. 
We focus on those cases where exactly one group member has the right answer, as it is only 
in these cases that contribution decisions have the potential to impact performance.33 Our 
design allows us to ask how performance varies across groups where one or both members do 
not know each other’s gender and groups in which both partners know each other’s gender. 
Given the significant gender gaps in performance across many domains, a reasonable null 
would predict that knowing gender should improve group performance. An interesting 
question is whether stereotyped beliefs are so exaggerated as to actually swamp any 
informational advantage of knowing gender. In this case, group performance could look more 
similar across the two treatments.  
 
																																																								
32 In Appendix C5, we present regressions that further explore these contribution results, showing that the patterns 
are robust to including controls for individual ability.	
33 If both group members have the correct answer, the group will answer correctly. If both group members have the 
incorrect answer, the group will never answer correctly. Thus, stereotypes can impact group performance through 
contribution decisions only for questions in which one group member has the correct answer.  
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Figure V. Group Performance 
Notes: Error bars reflect confidence intervals, where SEs are clustered at the group level. 
 
Figure V shows the results, both overall and by gender-type of the domain. Overall, both 
members knowing each other’s gender has a modest but significant negative impact on group 
performance: groups submit the correct answer approximately 2pp less often when they both 
know each other’s gender than when they don’t (69% versus 71%, p<0.05). The results for 
each sub-group of domains suggest an insignificant, but directionally negative, impact of 
knowing gender on group performance. Any advantage of knowing gender is completely 
crowded out by the overreaction to information entailed by stereotypes.  For instance, just as 
Figure IV shows, a woman learning that her partner is male would be too underconfident in 
her own relative ability in male-typed categories, translating into fewer contributed answers 
and a directionally negative impact on group performance.    
 
 
7. Conclusion  
Despite substantial evidence that, in some domains, men are more overconfident than 
women about their ability, the sources of such overconfidence are not completely understood.   
Nor do we have a clear understanding of the sources of beliefs about the ability of others, and 
why such beliefs are often inaccurate.  In this paper, we presented evidence that beliefs about 
both oneself and others to a significant extent come from the same two sources.  The first 
source is stereotyping, and in particular the kernel of truth hypothesis whereby beliefs 
exaggerate true aspects of reality.  The second source is overestimation of the ability of both 
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oneself and others, which increases with the difficulty of the question, what we called 
difficulty-influenced mis-estimation or DIM.  Because we collect data not only on beliefs 
about oneself but also on beliefs about others, and do so for a variety of difficulties and 
domains, we can disentangle these two sources to shed light on beliefs about gender.  
Stereotypes cause the participants in our experiments to exaggerate the actual gender 
performance gaps, leading women to be much less confident about themselves in domains 
where the male advantage is larger.  Stereotypes also play a role in explaining men’s 
confidence, although not as much as they do for women.  Crucially, stereotypes also matter 
for beliefs about others. Holding fixed category difficulty, both men and women 
underestimate the ability of women relative to men in male-typed domains, and overestimate 
it in female-typed domains.  We also found that stereotypes are reflected in beliefs about 
relative and not just absolute ability, and actually influence behavior.  DIM and stereotypes 
combine to encourage more self-confident behavior of men, and less self-confident behavior 
of women, but really only in male-typed fields. 
Disentangling the causes of the gender gap in beliefs may help interpret the existing 
evidence, but also inform interventions aimed at narrowing these gaps.  To the extent that 
stereotypes shape this gap, the reality that actual performance differences between genders 
are narrowing, especially at the upper tail, suggests that stereotypes will become less extreme 
over time. Role models and other manifestations of similar performance of men and women 
in the right tail may have big effects on reducing the gap.  Porter and Serra (2017) find a 
large effect of female role models on the choice of economics concentration, which is 
consistent with this view. In areas where actual differences remain, factors that make gender 
(or ethnicity, or race) less top of mind would diminish the effects of stereotypes on beliefs.  
Although we do not understand the causes of mis-estimation as well, the Moore Healy model 
suggests that objective feedback about ability will diminish the influence of DIM on self-
confidence.  But if DIM is driven by factors other than information, such feedback might not 
help.      
Our analysis also suggests that the same factors that shape confidence might also shape 
discrimination.  Unlike in the standard models of statistical discrimination, our experimental 
evidence suggests that beliefs are inaccurate in equilibrium.  Recent research on gender 
(Behren, Imas, and Rosenberg 2017), ethnicity (Grover, Pallais, and Paviente 2017), and race 
(Arnold, Dobbie, and Yang 2017) shows that inaccurate beliefs that look very much like 
stereotypes are at the heart of discriminatory practices.  Because our evidence shows that 
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beliefs about oneself and others are shaped by very similar psychological forces, the 
mechanisms that reduce the gap in self-confidence are also likely to reduce discrimination. 
Perhaps the central message of our analysis, then, is the importance of psychological 
distortions in beliefs about gender.  Research on self-confidence has appreciated the central 
role of such distortions for a long time. Stereotypes might be a useful concept for organizing 
and developing this analysis, in part because they point to the close relationship between 
beliefs and reality that varies across domains.  Research on discrimination and the centrality 
of inaccurate beliefs about others has been more recent, and here as well stereotypes offer a 
new conceptualization.  Our principal conclusion is that stereotyping and distortions related 
to task difficulty provide a unified framework for the study of distorted beliefs.  By showing 
the role of these two factors, our analysis suggests a strategy for unification of disparate 
findings, but also of moving forward with both empirical research and policy.   
 
Disclosure: We have reported all treatments conducted, all measures and materials are available in Appendix A, 
and data exclusions are described in Table I. At OSU, we ran 20 sessions, targeting approximately 400 total 
participants. At Harvard we ran until we had collected data from 250 participants. At UCSB, we ran until we 
had collected data from at least 200 women and 200 men who had attended high school in the United States.   
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